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… AND THE ENTIRE MASS 




The attitude of Nicholas II towards the pogroms
 
Comprehensive political biography of the last Russian emperor Nicholas II is still
to be written. Reserved, secretive, changeable and at the same time of very simple
character, the last tsar, who made so many controversial decisions and statements,
often appeared as an enigmatic figure for both his contemporaries and later
historians. Yet one of the most revealing stories describing the political portrait of
Nicholas II was his attitude towards one of the most tragic events which happened
during his reign, the pogroms. 
The bloody wave of pogroms that swept through Russia after the publication of





 After growing revolutionary events, when the people more
and more decisively stood against the tsar, the pogroms confuted the seemingly
obvious suggestion that the regime had no social support and was entirely isolated.
The pogrom reaction against the October Manifesto demonstrated that, apart from
the police, the autocracy of Nicholas II had some popular support in the struggle
with revolution, even if of an extremely dubious character.
 














conservative by virtue of their illiteracy and restricted
prospects and supposedly unquestionably supported the autocracy and “the established
traditions.” At the beginning of the twentieth century the opponents of the autocracy




 (Black Hundredists) because of their
supposed “backwardness” and “proneness to violence,” emphasising their involvement in
pogroms. “Pogromist” and “Black Hundredist” became almost synonymous. In turn, the rising
Rightist political parties willingly accepted this nickname as they claimed to be representatives
of the “Black millions” of simple silent-majority Russians. V.M. Purishkevich, the leading
Rightists’ speaker in the Duma, when he was asked about his party affiliation, proudly declared
“valiant Black Hundreds of the Union of the Russian People.” Thus “Black Hundreds” meant











 However, the events after 17 October differed in scope, which was
unprecedented. Almost simultaneously pogroms flared up over the whole area of
the huge empire.
The pogrom scenario was frequently the same in different places. After the
astounding news of the October Manifesto, demonstrations and meetings with red
flags began to occur. Now and then they were accompanied by excesses insulting to
the tsarist throne. Portraits of Nicholas II, so revered by monarchists, were taken
down from walls and sometimes destroyed; at meetings money was collected “for
Nicholas’ burial.” In Kiev, on the balcony of the City Duma building, one of those
in a meeting cut a hole in a tsarist portrait and, sticking his own head through the





of autocracy, old customs, and “order” regarded such events as an outrage — a




,” and came out with a furious protest.
Real cases of offenses to monarchist symbols similar to that described above were
not ubiquitous; sometimes they were exaggerated or just invented from nothing by
pre-pogrom rumours, often with preposterous accusations of outrages against
Orthodox shrines or tsarist portraits. For example, right before a pogrom in Kiev








 against the Goloseevskii
monastery. Black Hundreds organized belligerent counter-demonstrations
(sometimes under pretext of celebrating the ninth anniversary of the ascension of
Nicholas II to the throne) which clashed with left-wing meetings, and fights turned
into pogroms. Depending on the possibility or desire of local authorities to restore




2. After Bloody Sunday, when St. Petersburg students declared an all-out political strike, it was
not always safe to appear on the streets in student attire. There were tens of cases of “groundless
beatings of students” by (as the Council of St. Petersburg University put it) “unknown people,”
sometimes in presence of the police. (Tsentral´nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv v
Sankt-Peterburge [TsGIA SPb], f. 139, op.1, d. 10203, l. 3; on incidents of “groundless




 (23 March, 1905), TsGIA SPb, f. 139, op.1, d. 10199, l. 190,









 (9 August and 13 September, 1905).
3. TsGIA SPb, f. 139, op. 1, d. 10236, l. 6, 27-36 ob.; S.A. Stepanov, 
 
Chernaia sotnia v Rossii
 
(Moscow, 1992): 58. 
4. “Zhid,” unlike neutral “evrei,” was insulting, particularly by the beginning of the twentieth









, LX, 1 (1982): 1-15.
5. On the pogroms of 1905-1906, see John Klier, Shlomo Lambroza, eds., 
 
Pogroms: Anti-
Jewish violence in modern Russian history
 
 (Cambridge, 1992): 191-289; Don Rawson, 
 
Russian
Rightists and the Revolution of 1905 
 









.: 49-85. Documents on the pogroms and materials from police
investigations were published soon after the events: 
 
Iz istorii kievskogo pogroma.
Vsepoddaneishii otchet i proizvedennye senatorom Turau issledovaniia prochin besporiadkov
v Kieve v oktiabre 1905 g.
 
 (Kiev, 1906); 
 





Kievskii i odesskii pogromy v otchetakh senatorov Turau i Kuz´minskogo
 
(St. Petersburg, 1907); I. Kleinershekhet, 
 
Delo ob oktiabr´skom pogrome v Simferopole.
Sudebnyi otchet
 
 (Simferopol´, 1907); 
 




Pogromy po ofitsial´nym dokumentam
 










In the Pale of Settlement pogroms were directed primarily against Jews; in
northern and central Russia — against students and the intelligentsia; in the
Caucasus, particularly in Baku, — against Armenians. The exact number of victims
of such bloody bacchanalia cannot be ascertained. S. A. Stepanov, using data from
police investigations, reckoned that during the October pogroms 1,622 people died
and 3,544 were injured. Determining nationality was only possible for 75 percent of
the murdered and 73 percent of the injured; from this Stepanov concluded that Jews
accounted for 711 of the murdered and 1,207 of the injured; Orthodox Christians
(Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians) accounted for 428 murdered and 1,246





not trusting police sources, used data from opposition materials; only among Jews,





 Victims were often random people and not at all
revolutionaries. During the horrible Tomsk massacre, when pogromists burned a
railroad officers’ building and killed all who tried to escape the blaze, 68 people
died, of whom only one, according to the police, was linked to the revolutionary
movement; most of the rest had not come to attend a revolutionary intelligentsia









did really turn out to be “senseless and merciless,” as Pushkin put it once.
In the pogroms poor defenseless Jews (including children and women) suffered
alongside those unlucky enough to be inside public buildings and educational
institutions that the pogromists thought to be dangerous hotbeds of sedition, or who





swept over the entire country, touching 358 settlements from Arkhangel´sk to





 The ruthlessness and mindless vandalism of the pogrom crowds shocked
the entire world.
The scope of disorder presumed a significant number of pogromists. Their exact
number, as well as of their victims, naturally cannot be determined with great
accuracy. Sir Arthur Nicolson, a British representative in Russia, hit the mark when




Stepanov, using contemporaries’ accounts, suggests that there were tens of
thousands of pogromists. Monarchist counter-demonstrations, after which the
disorder began, assembled up to thirty thousand people in Krasnoiarsk, twenty-five
 
6. S. A. Stepanov, 
 
Chernaia sotnia v Rossii, op. cit.: 
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10. Public Record Office, London (PRO), Foreign Office, 800.337, 1 July, 1906.
of various documents on anti-Jewish pogroms was published by the Jewish authors:

















To establish the social make-up of pogromists using data from official inquiries
turned out to be much simpler. Practically all pogromists (more than 99 percent)









example, in Nizhny Novgorod a group of pogromists brought before a court for
judgment was typical and included two innkeepers, two coachmen, a shoemaker, a





Tver´, apart from a solid group of workers, artisans, and peasants, the pogrom
gangs remarkably included guardians of social order, police-officers, along with





One could conclude that pogromists emerged from wide illiterate lower social
strata, conservative already because of their limited views, and therefore the bitterest
opponents of all reforms and changes, of “sedition” as they put it. They were also




 and anti-noble sentiments found fertile soil in these strata. Their anger
was stimulated not only by the irritating and mysterious “liberation movement” but
also by various disasters, brought on by the October 1905 general strike — closed
factories, schools, shops and pharmacies, paralyzed transportations, revolutionary
violence. In the days of the pogroms they merged with big lumpen “vagabonds,”
always ready to smash and wreck and eager to rob, especially those defenseless. This
public, using the bewilderment, connivance, or incitement of the police apparatus in





 Almost inevitably, the tsar’s portrait was present at these disgraceful events.





 It played an important symbolic role, highlighting the
assembled crowd’s loyalty to the throne and as if it had provided tsarist sanction to
the pogrom. Among pogromists rumours spread wildly that Nicholas II “permitted”
them to wreck and smash and to beat the seditious anti-monarchy rebels. In Tomsk
the following ritual was observed: a crowd would come up to a store, and the one
walking up front would turn to the portrait of Nicholas II and ask, “Your Majesty,
do you allow us to destroy [this store]?” The one carrying the portrait would
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 (13 December, 1906).
14. S. V. Lavrikov, “Sotsial´naia prinadlezhnost´ uchastnikov pogroma v Tveri 17 oktiabria
1905 g.,” in 
 
Neizvestnye stranitsy istorii Verkhnevolzh´ia. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov
 
 (Tver´,
1994): 44-57. Interestingly, insofar as the Tver´ pogrom did not have a nationalities flavour
(given the insignificant number of Jews there), the Jewish watch-maker E. Zil´berman joined
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As monarchical processions progressed along their paths, all people met along
the way were tested for their loyalty to the tsar: they had to remove their caps before
the tsar’s portrait. Those who refused were forced to comply. The reactions to this
“test of loyalty” differed. Pavel Miliukov, witnessing such a scene in Moscow,









Bolshevik V. E. Morozov, encountering a monarchical procession in Ivanovo-





shot at the portrait, and then killed the two carrying the portrait; then he himself was




 Needless to say, such association with the pogroms threw a dark shadow over
the Head of supreme authority. The tsar’s immoderate allies had provided well-
intentioned action that ultimately backfired. Grave damage was inflicted also on the
reputations of that political order which had supporters of this sort.
The opposition’s accusations that the “tsarist government” was organizing




 They contained no
real evidence but their tone was extremely sharp. Radical liberals in allusions, and
revolutionaries directly, accused the emperor himself of leadership of the pogroms.
“Can anyone have any doubt that these pogroms were prepared ahead of time on the




 Although no evidence was found
(even in investigations after 1917) of the involvement of the tsar or his ministers in
organization of pogroms, the point of view that pogromists were manipulated from




Although the anti-semitic views of Nicholas II were naturally not advertised,
they were not a great secret, either. Nicholas II had a benevolent character, but his
worldview was well suited for acceptance of anti-semitism. His rejection of
modernisation, his mysticism, his confusion about the real world, his application of
moral values to his allies and enemies (e.g. when the first belonged to “the good”
and the latter to “the nasty”), his nationalism (e.g. when allies to autocracy were
defined as “true Russians”) — all these traits led Nicholas II to the conclusion that
opponents to his unlimited power were mostly “Yids,” as the tsar almost invariably
and despicably called his Jewish subjects. He was undoubtedly influenced by many
in his entourage who shared this view. The idea of Jews as a leading revolutionary




 It cannot be said that
the emperor intentionally fomented anti-semitism as a deliberate policy to direct
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Sovremennik: Nikolai II. Razoblacheniia
 
 (Berlin, 1909):257.
21. S.M. Dubnov, 
 
History of the Jews in Russia and Poland,
 
 vol. 3 (Philadelphia, 1920):127.
22. See: John Klier, 
 
Imperial Russia’s Jewish question
 






popular discontent against a chosen scapegoat. On the contrary, the sincere anti-
semitism of Nicholas II was an expression of his uncomplicated nature.
As the revolutionary movement grew, the emperor’s anti-semitism took on a
panicked astonishment before the treachery and secret might of the Jewish
conspiracy. Nicholas II had only a very foggy understanding of the real reasons for
revolutionary activity, parties, doctrines, and ideals. One can imagine how the
abundance of Jewish names in newspaper accounts and in the ministries’ reports on
revolutionary crimes created in the emperor’s head a picture of a Jewish plot. Later
in Siberia in 1917 the former emperor decided to systematise his own observations
and put together a list of revolutionary leaders and their Jewish surnames.
V. I. Ul´ianov-Lenin was mistakenly listed as “Tsederblium,” G. E. Zinov´ev as
Apfelbaum (his correct Jewish surname was Radomysl´skii), but other than these,
the former tsar got his surnames right and correctly identified L. D. Trotsky,




 Nicholas II always remembered names
very well.
Given the tsar’s attention and trust in the messages from Black Hundred
organizations, undoubtedly the torrent of anti-semitic petitions also had an
influence on him. Especially after the formation of right-wing parties, the tsar was
flooded by an enormous number of telegrams and letters about how “the Orthodox





Nicholas II stated at a meeting with the German ambassador (!) in the beginning of
1907 that the world wide union of Jews and Masons was a “deadly danger” and that




The tsar’s sympathies towards the first major pogrom during his reign
(Kishinev, 1903) are indicated in remarks by general A. N. Kuropatkin, at that
time close associate of Nicholas II, in his diary on April 14, 1903, on a personal
conversation with the Minister of Internal Affairs, V. K. Plehve, in which the
Kishinev pogrom was discussed: “I heard from Plehve 
 
as well as from the tsar
 
that Jews needed to be given a lesson that they had become conceited and they




 When and in what exact form
Nicholas II expressed such a thought Kuropatkin did not explain. However,
knowing the tsar’s anti-semitism, it is likely that such a conversation did exist. It
was striking that the tsar did not hurry to express his support and provide aid to
those of his subjects who became the victims of the pogrom. Plehve, receiving a
worried Jewish deputation after the pogrom, assured them that the tsar was
sorrowful about the pogrom and wanted to render to the suffering Jews fifteen
 
23. Mark Steinberg, Vladimir Khrustalev, eds., 
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Ivanovo station in 1906 (GARF, f. 601, op. 2, d. 8, l. 6). See also: GARF, f. 116, op. 1, d. 625
(Letters from Black Hundreds on the “Jewish domination” in various areas of life, 1905-1916).
25. Heinz-Dietrich Löwe, 
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Imperial Russia, 1772-1917
 
 (Chur, 1993): 223.














thousand rubles, but Plehve had “convinced him to wait” perhaps so as not to stir





The emperor’s opinion of the October 1905 pogroms is known already quite
clearly from a letter of October 27, 1905, to his mother, where he presented his
rather direct view on the occurrences:
In the first days after the Manifesto bad elements strongly raised their heads, but
then a strong reaction came up, and the entire mass of loyal people leapt up.
The result was understandable and usual for our place: the people were
outraged by the audacity and insolence of the revolutionaries and socialists, and
since nine-tenths of them were Yids, then all hostility was directed at them —
and thus the Jewish pogroms. It was striking since everything happened
immediately and with surprising unanimity in all cities of Russia and Siberia. In
England, of course, they write that these disorders were organized by the police,
as usual — the old familiar false story! Not only Jews but also Russian agitators,
engineers, lawyers, and all other foul people suffered. Events in Tomsk,
Simferopol´, Tver´, and Odessa clearly showed to what limits a fierce crowd can
go when it surrounded homes where revolutionaries had holed themselves up




In this way Nicholas II considered the pogromists — in contrast to their victims —
to be “loyal people,” and thus sympathized with their spontaneous impulse. Yet the
tsar also admitted the wildness of the “fierce crowd.” He emphatically wrote about
the pogroms as spontaneous occurrences, fully denying any kind of organizational
role by the authorities. It is highly doubtful, Heinz-Dietrich Löwe has noted, that





 It is absolutely groundless to claim that the tsar played an organizational
role behind the scenes, planning the pogroms from his Peterhof palace in the
autumn of 1905.
In his next letter to Maria Fedorovna Nicholas II criticized Witte’s government,
which was trying to calm the country, for its inability to stop the disturbances and
again referred to the pogroms:
But I cannot hide from you my certain disillusionment with Witte. Everyone
thought that he was terribly energetic and despotic and that he would
immediately initiate the process of establishing order […]. And everything
turned out quite the opposite — everywhere demonstrations began, then Jewish




Clearly Nicholas II did not expect such effects, including the pogroms, in the wake
of the October Manifesto. It is noteworthy that Nicholas II lumped together the
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30. Letter from 10 November, 1905, cited in Marc Ferro, Nikolai II (Moscow, 1991): 116-117. 
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revolutionary demonstrations, gentry pogroms, and Jewish pogroms as different
sides of the same phenomenon of mass disorder that needed to be stopped.
The tsar’s public statements confirmed that it was just what he meant. On a
report about the disorders in Balashov, Saratov guberniia, where a crowd had
attacked a meeting of the local intelligentsia (many of whom were doctors),
Nicholas II wrote, “Revolutionary demonstrations cannot be tolerated, together
with this, the arbitrary actions of the crowd cannot be allowed.” The resolution was
published in Pravitel´stvennyi vestnik.31 Receiving a peasant deputation from the
Tula guberniia on February 23, 1906, the tsar cautioned them against “the
incitements of the enemies of order,” revolutionary agitators, and further still
announced, “But do not deal with them yourselves, but turn them over to the
authorities, who will deal with them with all the severity of the law.”32
 Naturally, right-wing unions presented a special pogrom danger. Nicholas II
constantly taught them during audiences to observe legality and order. On
December 1, 1905, during a speech before representatives of the Russian People’s
Union (Soiuz Russkikh Liudei) and other emerging right-wing groups, the tsar
openly told them that unleashing malicious passions and mutual hostility was “a
great sin.”33 However, one would only need to briefly glance over almost any copy
of the Rightist newspapers Zemshchina or Russkoe znamia, as the tsar regularly
did, to see that his calls were being ignored.
V. N. Kokovtsov highlighted the tsar’s full understanding of the necessity of
stopping the pogrom threat after Stolypin’s assassination in September 1911. At the
interrogation of the Extraordinary Commission of the Provisional Government, the
former prime minister stated that his decisive measures to avert pogroms, including
a telegram to all governors in the Pale of Settlement demanding to open fire upon
pogromist crowds if necessary, received the tsar’s “full approval.”34 “What a
nightmare to take revenge upon the guiltless mass for the guilt of one Jew,” the tsar
said, according to Kokovtsov.35
31. Pravitel´stvennyi vestnik, 173 (1905). Opposition newspapers widely accused Stolypin, at
that time the Saratov governor, of organizing the Balashov massacre. Stolypin, in letters to his
wife, rejected these accusations as ludicrous, writing that he “was being slandered for the
Balashov affair,” that he himself was injured by a crowd attack when “defending doctors.”
“Already the mean local press has accused me, who had saved the city (this is true!), of the
organization of the Black Hundreds.” Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv (RGIA),
f. 1662 (Stolypin), op. 1, d. 231, ll. 36, 44 ob., 65 ob.
32. Pravitel´stvennyi vestnik, 48 (1906). The peasants’ harsh treatment of revolutionary
agitators from the cities did take place. The well-known social democrat V. S. Voitinskii, one of
the most popular revolutionary orators at meetings in St. Petersburg, wrote about his experience
of agitation amidst peasants, where he and his partner were grabbed by a peasant crowd and
avoided a terrible death only thanks to a Cossack detachment that arrested them and threw them
in jail. Set free after a short period, Voitinskii continued the struggle against that tsarist regime
that had saved him. V. S. Voitinskii, Gody pobed i porazhenii (Berlin, 1923).
33. Pravitel´stvennyi vestnik (2 December, 1905). 
34. A. Serebrennikov, G. Sidorovnin, eds., Stolypin. Zhizn´ i smert´ (Saratov, 1991):174. 
35. V. N. Kokovtsov, Iz moego proshlogo. Vospominaniia. 1911-1919 (Moscow, 1991): 44. 
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The sincerity of public and private declarations of the head of the state could be
verified first and foremost by the actions of the government he appointed. There is
no evidence that the closest executors of the tsar’s will, his ministers, were involved
in the organization of pogroms. Professor Hans Rogger refuted the widely-
distributed thesis that the government had planned the pogroms.36 Sergei Witte’s
interests had nothing to do with pogroms, on the contrary, he was interested in
stopping pogroms and, indeed, pogromists were his worst enemies. The Minister of
Internal Affairs P. N. Durnovo has attracted more suspicion. Archival materials,
however, demonstrate that Durnovo’s assurances (which he gave to anxious Witte),
that he did not belong “to those people who consider Jewish pogroms a useful
phenomenon” and was doing “everything possible” to support social order37 were
genuine. Durnovo gave regular instructions to the governors general that
“observance of total order and elimination of all attempts at Jewish pogroms is
absolutely necessary. Under current circumstances even the smallest disorders,
violence and open arbitrariness will have extremely disastrous consequences for
the state.” He demanded from local authorities “the most decisive measures”
against pogroms, “eliminating even the least grounds for them.”38 Durnovo’s
successor, Petr Stolypin, also demanded they take preventative measures at the
appearance of even the slightest threat of a pogrom.39
There are serious doubts about the practical possibility of the government-
made-pogroms version. In October 1905 the government could hardly have a clear
idea of the situation throughout the country — not to mention its ability to organize
planned actions in 358 places. Connections between the capital and regions were
severed or made difficult by the telegraph and postal strike. The Irkutsk governor
could not explain to his people even on October 21 what was happening in St.
Petersburg since news of the October Manifesto had still not reached him. With the
declaration of the Manifesto the police leadership were in euphoric mood, thinking
that in the new era of freedom police work would drastically decline. When a
political amnesty was announced, representatives of the Soviet of Workers’
Deputies went to check whether anyone was under arrest in the St. Petersburg
Department of Security. They had even seen the office of the Security Chief
Gerasimov himself. “The situation was such that one would think that if
representatives of the Soviet wanted to see papers on my table, they would let
36. Hans Rogger, “Conclusion” and “Overview,” in: J.Klier, S.Lambroza, Pogroms, op.
cit.:345.
37. See: R. Sh. Ganelin, “Chernosotennye organizatsii, politicheskaia politsiia i
gosudarstvennaia vlast´ v tsarskoi Rossii,” in: Natsional´naia pravaia prezhde i teper´. Istoriko-
sotsiologicheskie ocherki. Chast´1 (St. Petersburg, 1992).
38. Coded dispatch #4350 of 20 March, 1906 (Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Warsaw
[AGAD]), f.Kantseliariia Varshavskogo General-Gubernatora, d. 2884 — directive on
forbidding Jewish pogroms — l. 2-2 ob.). See also the telegram from P.N. Durnovo to
governors on 26 February, 1906 (ibid., l.1).
39. Urgent telegrams from P. A. Stolypin to the Warsaw Governor General of September 3,
1906 (ibid, l.5, 8). 
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them,” Gerasimov wrote.40 There is little doubt that if the government planned the
“pogrom wave” from the centre, such an inclination would have come to the
surface in this particular period. But there was no evidence this was the case.
It seems that there was, in fact, no single figure in the government who could
take on such a responsibility. The organization of pogroms involved a colossal risk.
It was impossible to predict to where and against whom popular agitations could
turn at any moment. The experience of the Kishinev pogrom, which damaged the
extravagant apartment of the Head of the local gentry along with Jewish homes,
showed that no one was secure against the threat of pogroms.41 In the course of the
October 1905 pogroms the home of vice-governor Ledokhovskii in Baku was
destroyed, as were the house of the Barnaul city Head or the apartment of an
Orthodox priest in the Riazan´ guberniia.42
Among those in power, direct responsibility for pogroms lay not with the central
authorities in Petersburg but with local authorities in their bewilderment or
tolerance of the violence. The negligence or even sometimes instigation of local
police officials, feeling helpless in the face of the 1905 revolution and dreaming of
vengeance against “Yids and students” created a chance for the pogrom riffraff.43 
Perhaps, a story exposed by high-ranked officials of the Ministry of Interior, the
former director of the Police Department A.A. Lopukhin (in his writings) and his
brother-in-law former deputy Minister of Interior Prince S.D. Urusov (in his Duma
speech) suggested a possible link between pogroms and the highest levels of
Russian authority.44 In a hidden corner of the St. Petersburg Police Department a
secret printing press was discovered, where pamphlets calling “to kill Jews, to tear
them apart into tiny pieces” were being printed under the supervision of the
gendarme officer M.S. Komissarov. From the capital they were being
disseminated throughout the country with the help of right-wing organizations and
through informal police channels. Komissarov was for a time subordinate to
P. I. Rachkovskii, the well-known author of anti-semitic political provocations,
40. A. V. Gerasimov, Na lezvii s terroristami (Moscow, 1991): 38, 41.
41. GARF, f. 601, op. 1, d. 1046 (V. K. Plehve’s notes on Jewish pogroms in Kishinev and
Pinsk), l.2ob.
42. S. A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii, op. cit.: 59, 62, 74.
43. In a number of regions the authorities actively opposed pogroms— for example, in many
Polish territories (AGAD, F. Pomoshchnik Varshavskogo General-Gubernatora, d. 772— on
encounters between Christians and Jews, l.10, 18-18 ob., 35, 77-77 ob.). On the other hand,
many eyewitnesses testified to the collaboration of the police with pogromists in Voronezh
(Vpered, zare navstrechu! Molodezh´ Voronezhskoi gubernii v revoliutsionnom dvizhenii.
1903-1920. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Voronezh, 1958): 33), Iur´ev (The Central State
Historical Archive, Republic of Estonia [CSHIE], f. 2623, op. 1, d. 59, l. 38; Revoliutsiia 1905-
1907 gg. v Estonii. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Tallin, 1955): 370), Kursk (Molodezh´ v
1905 g. (Moscow-Leningrad, 1926):108-113), and Odessa (Khronika odesskikh sobytii
(Odessa, 1906): 23-27).
44. A. A. Lopukhin, Otryvki iz vospominanii. (Po povodu “Vospominanii” grafa S. Iu. Vitte).
(Moscow-Petrograd, 1923); Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety. Chast´ 1.
Sessiia 1 (St. Petersburg, 1906): columns 270-277. 
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particularly he stood behind the appearance of the infamous Protocols of the Elders
of Zion. In the period of Witte’s government Rachkovskii hold a post in the
Ministry of Internal Affairs being responsible “for the execution of crucial
assignments in the area of higher politics” and was known for his closeness to D. F.
Trepov. Accordingly, revolutionaries and liberals pointed to Trepov as the
inspiration for the pogrom provocation. Prince Urusov described him (as it was
widely popularised by relevant newspapers) as “a cavalry sergeant plus policeman
in his upbringing, and a pogromist in his conviction.” Trepov was the closest
political figure to Nicholas II.45 
It is likely that the creation of underground press in the police was not Komissarov’s
idea, who, in Urusov’s description, “was appointed [by someone] and not came up by
his own initiative” at the printing press. Rachkovskii possibly put Komissarov up to
this, however there is no evidence that Trepov sanctioned this activity.
It is known that the typography was at work in December, and at the start of
1906 Komissarov broke the press after a reprimand from Witte. One can only guess
at the activities before and during the pogrom wave.
Characteristically, however, Komissarov was not punished, thanks to good
references given to him by Witte, but he later even had a distinguished career.
Regardless of the scandalous story, Komissarov reached the status of a general,
which could not be achieved without the tsar’s good graces.46 Those disseminating
the pamphlets printed at the police, activists of the Black Hundred parties, were
rewarded with gracious receptions by Nicholas II. All this created a basis for
continuous rumors at the police apparatus — that formidable circulars of the
government on counteractions against the pogroms and public admonitions of the
tsar against the violence were simply “to create a false impression,” while the real
inclinations of the authorities, about which they preferred to remain silent, were
different. The tsar’s anti-semitism was well-known.
Lopukhin revealed his conversation with General D. V. Drachevskii, appointed
as governor of Rostov. Because of his promotion he was introduced to Nicholas II.
In Drachevskii’s words written by Lopukhin, Nicholas II wished to note to the
general, “You have so many Yids there both in Rostov and Nakhichevan´,” to
which Drachevskii reported that yet many Jews had died during the military actions
against the revolution and the pogroms that followed. “No,” the tsar supposedly
interrupted, “I expected that many more would die!” According to Lopukhin,
Drachevskii understood the tsar’s phrase as “His Majesty’s instruction” that in case
of more pogroms the authorities would shut their eyes.47 Thus the tsar’s careless but
45. For more, see R. Sh. Ganelin, “Pechatanie pogromnykh listovok v Departamente politsii,”
in: Natsional´naia pravaia prezhde i teper´, op. cit. 
46. Komissarov’s successful career and his debt for this to Nicholas II and Sergei Witte was
due to his activities in military intelligence during the Russo-Japanese War; see
P. E. Shcheglov, ed., Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, vol. 3 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1925):104-112;
S. Iu. Vitte, Vospominaniia, vol. 3 (Moscow — Tallinn, 1994):84.
47. A. A. Lopukhin, Otryvki iz vospominanii, op. cit.: 85-86.
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unobliging remark in the circumstances of revolution, wide-spread anti-semitism of
bureaucrats and official third-rate status of Jewish citizenship, could lead yet to
another tragedy.
 The tsar’s attitude towards the pogroms was most clearly expressed in the
authorities’ punitive policy towards the participants, although the term “punitive”
should not be understood in its normal sense here — in general the pogromists were
treated with leniency. Courts normally dealt with pogroms according to the law
introduced after the anti-Jewish disorders that followed the murder of Alexander II
in the nineteenth century — pogromists were tried for participation in crowd
violence and looting (article 269 part 1, Code on Punishment). The same article of
the law applied to peasants robbing gentry “on a revolutionary basis,” or what
leftists proudly dubbed “agrarian campaigns.” A harsh punishment awaited
pogromists, since the tsarist regime was not among those that tolerated crowd
disturbances. Socialists, however, immediately began to point out that they were
being treated more harshly than revolutionaries from the right.48
Special senatorial commissions investigated the circumstances of all major
pogroms. According to Stepanov’s calculations, a minimum of 205 “pogrom
processes” were opened from the investigation’s conclusions.49 Statistics from that
time demonstrated that from the general number of those brought to court, in 1908
54.3 percent were found not guilty, and in 1909 — 55.6 percent.50 1,860 people were
convicted, almost inevitably receiving easier punishment from those allowable by
law. Some pogrom participants received several weeks or months in prison. More
than half of the convicted received eight months in jail. The hardest punishments
were meted out for murder during the pogroms — ten years of hard labour.51
 The Right vigorously sympathized with the convicted. A. S. Shmakov came
forward as a defender at the pogrom processes. A loud campaign arose in defense of
pogromists and brought accusations against the courts and government.
N. D. Obleukhov wrote, “…voluntary defenders of the existing order were fully
given to courts filled with Kadets and to Yids-lawyers. Patriotism found itself on
the defendants’ bench. Yesterday’s revolutionary rebels or their sympathizers were
trying patriots for their patriotism.”52 The Right’s hope was for clemency from the
tsar, and not in vain.
 When Count A. I. Konovnitsyn, head of the Odessa section of the Union of the
Russian People (Soiuz Russkogo Naroda) and a favourite of the tsar, complained to
Nicholas II about lack of mercy from the courts towards “patriots,” the emperor
assured him that he also knew that Russian courts were too harsh to pogrom
48. L. Martov, “Ballans pravosudiia,” Otkliki, vol. 1 (1906): 42. 
49. S. A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii, op. cit.: 81. 
50. A. B. Ventin, “K statistike repressii v Rossii. (Iz itogov 1908-1909),” Sovremennyi mir, 4
(1910):75. 
51. S. A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii, op. cit.: 81.
52. Cited in: Iu. I. Kir´ianov, ed., Pravye partii. Dokumenty i materialy, 1905-1917 (Moscow,
1998), vol. 1: 1905-1910gg.: 53.
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participants, and he promised Konovnitsyn that he would always soften the
sentences on petition from the Union.53
Flooding the tsar with Unionist “beseechings” (chelobitnye) went into full
swing. Minister of Justice I. G. Shcheglovitov took personal control of the affair,
presenting appeals for clemency to Nicholas II during his reports. Emphasis was
mainly put on two mitigating circumstances: the accused acted “under the influence
of the crowd” and “because of hostility towards Jews.”54 Asked why the latter
served as an argument for giving clemency, Shcheglovitov answered that hostility
to Jews “in certain strata of our population” led to a situation when “passion and the
well-known feeling of hatred played a predominant role, where reason and clear
thoughts had retreated to the background.”55 His direct participation in the affair
and sympathy for the accused from the authorities the Minister of Justice explained
with the fact that “such was the general political point of view […]. The
government had placed high hopes on right-wing organizations, seeing in them
support for the existing political order.”56
Nicholas II reviewed requests for clemency with almost unexceptional favour.
In historical literature it was often stated that the tsar confirmed all petitions for
clemency.57 Archival materials on clemency cases suggest some correction to this
view but yet do not change the overall portrait. The tsar refused clemency for 78
pogromists; his decisions on 147 others remains unknown; for 1,713 cases — an
overwhelming majority — petitions for clemency were satisfied.58
This procedure, however, took up a significant amount of time. Shcheglovitov
was presenting to the tsar a certain number of cases once a month. In 446 cases, the
convicted had served out their terms before the declarations of clemency were
issued, although the main part were still imprisoned. Only 195 of the convicted
pogromists did not serve any time.59
Among the masses of lesser-known forgiven pogromists there were rather
renowned individuals. For example, Nikolai F. Mikhailin, the murderer of the
prominent social democrat N. Bauman, was pardoned.60
News about such pardons was greeted with triumph by both the Black Hundreds
and the opposition.61 For the former, the tsar’s mercy meant Supreme patronage
53. Robert Warth, Nicholas II. The life and reign of Russia’s last monarch (Westport,
1997):102.
54. Incidences of clemency (cf. GARF, f.124, op.45, d.1835-1926; op.65, d.54-219) were
first analysed by S.A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii, op. cit.: 49-82. 
55. Iu. I. Kir´ianov, ed., Pravye partii, op. cit., vol. 2: 1911-1917 gg.:717.
56. Ibid.:716.
57. For example, A. S. Tager, Tsarskaia Rossiia i delo Beilisa (Moscow, 1934): 47-48; Robert
Warth, Nicholas II, op. cit.:102.
58. S. A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii, op. cit.:82.
59. Ibid.
60. Krasnyi arkhiv, 11-12 (1925):443.
61. For example, see Russkoe znamia (14 March, 1907); Sovremennik: Nikolai II.
Razoblacheniia, op. cit.: 327-328
206 SERGEI PODBOLOTOV
and the longed-for overcoming of the bureaucratic barrier (sredostenie) between
tsar and people.62 For the latter, the tsar’s favourable attitude served as proof of the
emperor’s sympathies with the darkest forces of Russian political world and their
evil deeds, and they used it as a strong argument to discredit the regime further. One
should note that often the defendants not only lacked the tact and intelligence to
express remorse, but during the judicial process they openly appealed to the tsar,
announcing that they already knew of his leniency in advance, and this was even
more harmful to the prestige of the authorities and the tsar himself.63
Witte described a story of the tsar’s reluctance to punish the criminals even in
the case of their clear guilt, when there were no visible “mitigating circumstances”
as acting because of “wild passions” “under the influence of the crowd.”
Investigations carried out by Witte’s government on the reasons for the
extraordinary cruel Gomel´ pogrom in 1906, showed that it was organized by a
local police officer who was a “true Russian count,” one Count G. Podgorichani,
who did not even feel obliged to deny his own role in the pogrom. The Council of
Ministers decided to turn Count Podgorichani over to the courts and relieve him
from service. This decision was submitted to Nicholas II for confirmation, who left
an angry resolution: “I have nothing to do with this. The question of the further
development of the case of Count Podgorichani belongs to the discretion of the
Minister of Internal Affairs.” Perhaps, the irritation of the tsar may be explained by
the fact that the revealed circumstances ran counter to his interpretation of the
pogroms as a spontaneous upsurge in a simple people loyal to their tsar.
Meanwhile, the Count was successfully transferred to a post of police officer in one
of the Black Sea cities.64
Neither Nicholas II nor his ministers prepared or led the pogroms or terrorist
acts, regardless of how often they were accused of such. The Trudovik
S. M. Ryzhkov claimed in the Duma, “Let the government leave, and we will see
that there will be no more pogroms.”65 Unfortunately, he was wrong. After the
tsarist government was forced “to leave” in 1917, pogroms recurred during the
Civil War with new force. But there is no doubt that under the last tsar, the well-
known anti-semitism of the monarch and of many of the members of the ruling elite
and police apparatus provoked anti-semitic actions.
Higher authorities expressed their attitude towards anti-semitic violence by
leniency to the guilty and ambivalence towards the victims. Nicholas II, hearing the
62. “If many of these accused were liberated from punishment, then this was exclusively
because of the personal will of His Imperial Majesty, and the government has nothing to do
with this,” wrote N. D. Obleukhov. (Iu. I. Kir´ianov, ed., Pravye partii, op. cit., vol. 1:53.) 
63. A. Chernovskii, ed., Soiuz Russkogo Naroda. Po materialam Chrezvychainoi Sledstvennoi
Komissii Vremennogo Pravitel´stva 1917 g. (Moscow — Leningrad, 1929):42; Delo o
pogrome v Orshe (n.d.).
64. S. Iu. Vitte, Vospominaniia, op. cit.:84. 
65. Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety. Pervyi sozyv, vol. 1-2 (St. Petersburg,
1906): column 956.
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news of the October 1905 pogroms, experienced nearly the same feelings as the
family of Prince S. P. Golitsyn, head of the Chernigov gentry:
A feeling of pride in the muzhik, who was being seduced from the path to truth
by Jews and agitators […] this feeling embraced us […]. We all one after
another cried out engulfed like children by a rapturous outburst, “Fine fellows,
what fine fellows!”; “There’s revolution for you!”; “There is a monarchical
people for you.”66
When the throne was shaken by revolutionary campaigns, it looked as if suddenly,
as in old days in the Time of Troubles, the people rose up to defend autocracy and
their tsar. This way events were interpreted by those (including the emperor
himself) who admired the idea of unity between tsar and people. Accordingly, some
representatives from that too stormy ocean of people’s passions should be
punished, but naturally not too severely. Weren’t the majority of victims, after all,
“bad people” who deserved to be taught a lesson? The myth replaced reality. The
authorities, sympathizing with pogromists, demonstrated their weakness and
handed a strong weapon to their critics.
Bilkent University
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